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CHAPTER 4
Budgeting Practices in European 
Universities
Marco Seeber and Benedetto Lepori
Abstract  This chapter aims to provide empirical evidence on budgeting 
practices in European universities through a cross-country universities 
analysis. We investigate what is the diffusion of given processes, alloca-
tion criteria and what actors have more the influence on budgeting, to 
what extent are budgeting practices related to the level of competition 
for funding and whether budgeting models with distinct practices can 
be identified. To this aim, we exploit evidence from the TRUE survey, 
which allows for the first time a systematic quantitative comparison of 
budgeting in European universities. The analysis reveals the complexity 
and multiplicity of budgeting practices, which contrasts with the taken-
for-granted assumption that NPM reforms are leading to convergence 
towards a managerial model of resource allocation within universities.
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IntroductIon
Budgeting decisions regard the level of expenditures and the reparti-
tion of resources among organizational subunits, representing one of 
the most critical organizational processes in higher education institutions 
(Lepori et al. 2013). Budgeting is closely related to key choices concern-
ing strategic priorities (Jarzabkowski 2002), resource acquisition strate-
gies (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988) setting incentives and norms for 
subunits and individual academics by linking resources to performance or 
acquisition of external resources (Laudel 2006).
Despite its relevance, there is no theoretical agreement on the nature 
of universities’ budgeting and scarce empirical investigation. Universities’ 
budgeting has been variably conceived as: (i) a technical device, i.e. as an 
intendedly rational but behaviourally constrained process to implement 
strategies and reach organizational goals, (ii) a bargaining process among 
internal organizational actors competing for resources and power, as 
well as a (iii) cultural and symbolic act to enact social norms and values 
through money allocation (Wildavsky 2002). These conceptualizations 
are related to alternative representations of universities’ decision-mak-
ing—such as the rational versus the garbage can models, the coalitional 
versus the institutionalized models—which differ in their accounts of the 
driving forces of decisions and of how universities respond to environ-
mental changes (Musselin 2007). Empirical studies have so far focused 
on individual cases and have been designed to test a specific organiza-
tional theory, like resource-dependency (Pfeffer and Moore 1980) or 
institutional theory (Ezzamel 1994), rather than taking into considera-
tion several perspectives at once. In turn, there is a lack of comparative 
analysis focusing on sources of variations in budgeting practices among 
individual universities. Hence, this chapter aims to provide empirical evi-
dence on budgeting practices in European universities through a cross-
country analysis. We investigate what is the diffusion of given budgeting 
processes, allocation criteria? What actors have more influence? To what 
extent are the budgeting practices related to the level of competition for 
funding? Can we identify budgeting models with distinct characteristics?
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
main budgeting dimensions and discusses how the characteristics of the 
resource environment are expected to affect the budgeting process. The 
third section presents the data and the methods. The analysis is developed 
in the fourth section. The main findings are discussed in the conclusions.
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conceptual Frame
Budgeting Dimensions
Budgeting practices can be described along three main dimensions, 
namely (i) processes, (ii) allocation criteria and (iii) actors involved 
(Lepori et al. 2013).
Processes
Universities’ budgeting has been conceived for long as a bargaining pro-
cess among competing coalitions, characterized by a fair degree of sta-
bility of allocation between units—high incrementalism (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1974; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988). In recent decades, how-
ever, reforms inspired by New Public Management (NPM) principles 
have promoted a transformation of universities towards formal organiza-
tions, the establishment of internal systems of rules and procedures, and 
spurred universities’ strategic behaviour and orientation towards the effi-
cient allocation of resources, even at the expenses of stability (Brunsson 
and Sahlin-Andersson 2000; Paradeise et al. 2009; Seeber et al. 2015). 
In turn, where the influence of NPM has been stronger, universities 
are expected to have shifted from a budgeting system characterized by 
a formal bureaucratic frame with much room for informal bargaining 
between parties and a high degree of incrementalism (Wildavsky and 
Caiden 2004), to a budgeting system where the leadership defines the 
strategy and set the goals, while using budgeting rules and incentives to 
pursue them, possibly with significant reallocation between units (Amaral 
and Meek 2003).
Actors
This dimension considers which actors are involved in the budgeting 
process and how, together, they take decisions concerning the reparti-
tion of resources. In the past, budgeting was dominated by bargaining 
between coalitions of departments (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974). NPM 
policies, though, have strengthened the role of the central manage-
ment—e.g. rectors and central administration (Amaral and Meek 2003). 
As a result, some scholars have argued that universities’ budgeting now 
combines elements of both the coalitional and the centralized models 
(Jarzabkowski 2002).
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Two different sets of criteria can be identified that drive internal allo-
cation of resources. First, allocation can be driven by criteria that are par-
ticularly relevant for external stakeholders, i.e. externally driven criteria 
that are related to the volume of activities produced by the unit in terms 
of the number of students, the number of graduates and the amount of 
third-party funds attracted. Alternatively, allocation can be driven by cri-
teria that are more relevant to internal stakeholders, i.e. internally driven 
criteria such as the reputation of the unit, the coherence with the univer-
sity strategy and the quality of the relationships of the units’ leaders with 
the central management.
The Influence of Competition for Funding on Budgeting Practices
The characteristics of the resource environment, and in particular the 
extent to which universities compete for funding, are expected to affect 
universities’ budgeting practices (Lepori et al. 2007). Several studies 
indicate that the level of competition for funding in the higher educa-
tion sector is stronger than in the past. First, the share of funds from 
the private sector on total universities revenues has grown (Auranen 
and Nieminen 2010). Moreover, the allocation of public funds to uni-
versities has become increasingly competitive, in the form of contracts 
and formulas that link resources to performance and volume of activity 
(Jongbloed 2008; Reale and Seeber 2013). More competition is expected 
to spur budgeting practices that link funding to a unit’s capability to 
attract students, third-party funds, and ‘produce’ graduates; to legitimize 
the emergence of a stronger leadership that can enact strategic decisions; 
and to reduce the level of incrementalism. Table 4.1 resumes the main 
expectations regarding the effect of competition on universities’ internal 
budgeting practices.
Table 4.1 Competition for funding: expected influence on universities’ budg-
eting practices
University level
Formula vs 
bargaining
Incrementalism Empowered 
actors
External 
criteria
System 
level
Competition Weak + Academics –
Strong – Leaders +
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data and methods
Data on budgeting practices were collected through a survey undertaken 
as part of the ‘Transforming Universities in Europe’ project (TRUE). 
The survey addressed the current characteristics and practices of uni-
versities, and was administered in spring 2011 to five groups of internal 
actors, namely rectors, central administrators, board and senate mem-
bers and deans. Twenty-six public universities were considered which are 
fairly representative of the variety of European universities in terms of 
size, age, quality level and discipline profile. The considered universities 
are located in eight European countries, reasonably representative of the 
European Higher Education landscape: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and France. 
687 completed questionnaires were collected, with a 48% response 
rate, which is rather high for similar types of inquiries (Baruch 1999). 
Responses were employed to construct quantitative measures and indica-
tors of the dimensions of interest.
The budgeting practices are analysed considering processes, actors’ 
influence and allocation criteria.
Budgeting Processes
To analyse the process dimension, we first consider whether internal 
budgeting allocation relies primarily on a formula or occurs via bargain-
ing between the parties involved. This issue was addressed by a specific 
question in the survey, where respondents should indicate the univer-
sity allocation procedure among three possible options: (a) essentially 
based on rules and quantitative formulas, (b) to some extent based on 
rules and quantitative formulas, as well as on some bargaining, and (c) 
essentially based on bargaining. The individual responses are weighted in 
order to obtain a university value ranging from 1, when all respondents 
agreeing on ‘rules and quantitative formulas’, to 0, when all respondents 
selected ‘essentially based on bargaining’, as expressed by the following 
indicator:
F_Bx = Σ1→n = (na ∗ 1+ nb ∗ 0.5+ nc ∗ 0)/n
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F_Bx   Importance of formula vs bargaining for allocation of resources 
in university x
n Number respondents in university x
na   Number respondents in university x selecting response a
nb   Number respondents in university x selecting response b
nc   Number respondents in university x selecting response c
The degree of incrementalism is measured from responses to the sur-
vey question addressing ‘the extent to which the current allocation will 
influence future allocations to the unit in five years’ time’. Respondents 
could choose from: (a) ‘essentially based on current budget’, (b) ‘may 
be significantly redistributed between units depending on strategic pri-
orities and unit performance, but there is a mechanism to avoid too 
strong changes’, to (c) ‘may be significantly redistributed between units 
depending on strategic priorities and unit performance’. The individual 
responses were weighted in order to obtain a university value, ranging 
from 1 for strong incrementalism to 0 for no incremental allocation, 
according to the following indicator:
Ix  Level of incrementalism in budgeting in university x
n  Number respondents in university x
na   Number respondents in university x selecting response a
nb   Number respondents in university x selecting response b
nc   Number respondents in university x selecting response c
Actors
The analysis of actors is based on a question regarding how funding is 
allocated to units. Respondents could choose between four main budget-
ing models conceived in the literature (Table 4.2).
The responses were converted into two university indexes measuring 
respectively the relative influence of the central and the departmental lev-
els on budgeting:
IX =
∑
1→n
= (na ∗ 1 + nb ∗ 0.5 + nc ∗ 0)/n
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where Ntotal is the total number of respondents in university x and NA, 
NB, NC, ND are the number of respondents for each response type in 
university x.
A second question specifically addressed the influence of the: (i) uni-
versity board, (ii) rector/president, (iii) central administration, (iv) 
middle management (deans), (v) faculty councils and (vi) influential aca-
demics.
Allocation Criteria
Different criteria can drive the distribution of resources between units. 
Six criteria were considered in the survey, and respondents had indicate 
their importance in a 5-point Likert scale, namely: the (i) number of stu-
dents, (ii) number of graduates, (iii) acquisition of third-party funding, 
Influence central university level = [(NA + NB)− (NC + ND)]/Ntotal
Influence departmental level = [(NB + NC)− (NA + ND)]/Ntotal
Table 4.2 Government, central and department influence, four models
Source Adapted from Lepori et al. (2013)
Weak departmental power Strong departmental power
Strong central power Central model Political model
Centralized budgeting. Item A: 
“Rectorate and central admin-
istration make decisions and set 
rules based on their objectives.”
Bargaining is important due to 
both parties having significant 
power. Item B: “Allocation is 
bilaterally negotiated between 
central administration and fac-
ulty/institutes/departments”
Weak central power State-led model Garbage can model
Allocation dictated external 
actors (e.g. the State). Item 
D: “The internal repartition 
of resources is an outcome of 
government decisions and there 
is little influence of institutional 
actors”
Chaotic interaction of strong 
subunits without centralized 
control. Item C: “There is 
collective bargaining between 
deans/heads of institutes/
departments with limited inter-
vention of central administra-
tion”
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(iv) reputation of the unit, (v) compliance with university strategic priori-
ties, and the (vi) relationships between the heads of units and the central 
management.
Statistical Properties of the Data
Table 4.3 provides information on the selected questions, regarding their 
type (nominal or ordinal), the number of respondents, the mean value 
and the standard deviation. The table also displays values of intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures variation in responses 
between universities, and the degree of inter-rater agreement (Rwg), 
which measures the concordance of responses from the same institution 
(James et al. 1984; van Mierlo et al. 2009).1 Survey data rely on individ-
ual perceptions, and they are particularly useful when an objective meas-
ure of a given phenomenon—such as influence and power of actors—is 
not available or difficult to retrieve. At the same time, survey data require 
analysing issues of validity—e.g. the extent to which they are close to the 
real value—as well as reliability—e.g. the extent to which responses are 
homogeneous. Regarding validity, there is no evidence of a systematic 
bias that shifts responses to TRUE questionnaire in a particular direc-
tion (Seeber et al. 2015). We assess reliability by considering the level of 
agreement of respondents from the same university as measured by the 
Rwg index of inter-rater agreement. Agreement is rather low regarding 
the influence of the board and of influential academics, whereas agree-
ment is stronger regarding the influence of the other actors, and particu-
larly on the strong importance of the university Rector (Rwg = 0.75). 
Agreement on the importance of each criterion is rather low, with the 
exception of the number of students, which is also the most important 
one. Uncertainty on this topic may derive from the fact that knowledge 
of allocation criteria is a rather technical issue. On the other hand, if the 
ranked importance of the different criteria is taken into consideration—
rather than absolute scores—then responses are highly consistent across 
respondents from the same university. In turn, reliability seems accept-
able, since it is higher for the most important items.
The indicator measuring the competition for funding combines: (i) the 
share of non-core grant fund on the total revenues for universities in the 
eight countries considered (normalized on the highest country value—
range from 0.8 to 4) (source: European Commission 2011; Aghion et al. 
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2008) and (ii) the level of incrementalism of the core grant allocation 
from public authorities (range 1–4) (Jongbloed 2008) (Table 4.4).
As control variables, organizational size, age, disciplinary concentra-
tion and research quality are taken into consideration.
Table 4.3 Data and indicators
*Converted into scale 1, 0.5, 0 (see paragraph 3.1)
Note: (i) Mean and standard deviation computed at respondents level; (ii) Rwg is not appropriate for 
scales below five; (iii) In this table the scales replicate those employed in the questionnaire: a value of 1 
points out a high importance and a value of 5 indicates no importance at all. Instead, in the next para-
graphs, the scales of tables and graphs have been changed to improve readability, using ‘1’ as a value for 
high influence and ‘0’ for no influence
Dimension Item Type N Mean SD ICC Rwg
Processes Formula vs bargaining Nominal (3)* 220  0.72  0.28 0.20
Level of incremental-
ism
Nominal (3)* 218  0.61  0.33 0.25
Actors Type of allocation: 
centralized vs decen-
tralized
Nominal (4) 365 47% response A; 40% B; 
6% C; 7% D
University board Scale (5); range 1–5 302 2.78 1.22 0.23 0.46
Rector, president, vice 
chancellor
355 1.59 0.82 0.06 0.75
Central administration 352 2.25 1.07 0.05 0.58
Middle management 
(deans, heads)
354 2.83 1.06 0.18 0.59
Faculty governing 
bodies
321 3.41 1.08 0.08 0.58
Influential individual 
academics
326 3.85 0.97 0.08 0.46
Criteria No. of students 
enrolled in unit’s 
curricula
Scale (5); range 1–5 417 2.29 1.02 0.14 0.64
No. of graduates 412 2.71 1.13 0.16 0.49
External funds 
acquired by the unit
424 2.77 1.10 0.17 0.53
Overall scientific 
reputation of the unit
425 2.72 1.11 0.12 0.47
Compliance with 
strategic university 
priorities
420 2.81 1.05 0.06 0.53
Relationship between 
the heads of subunits 
and central manage-
ment
411 3.45 1.12 0.04 0.42
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Methods
The empirical analysis is structured in three parts. First, each dimen-
sion is analysed as to: (i) process, in terms of the relationship between 
incrementalism and formula; (ii) allocation criteria and (iii) actors. Factor 
analyses allow identifying the major components and exploring their 
meaning and relationships. Second, the link between the level of com-
petition for resources and the internal budgeting practices is explored. 
Finally, we investigate the existence of clusters of universities according 
to their budgeting practices in terms of processes, actors and criteria. To 
identify the clusters, a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is employed, which is 
the proper statistical method to identify subtypes of related cases (latent 
classes) from multivariate categorical data (Collins and Lanza 2013).
analysIs and results
Processes
Formula vs. bargaining
Overall, the formula is more important for funding allocation than bar-
gaining (mean value of 0.72, where ‘1’ is full formula and ‘0’ full bar-
gaining), although a high variation is observed across universities in our 
sample (ICC 0.20) (Table 4.3). The formula always plays a significant 
Table 4.4 Competition for funding index
*Sources European Commission (2011) and Aghion et al. (2008) for Germany
**Average A and B
% non-core grant 
funds on total 
revenues*
A: % non-core-
grants funds on 
total revenues 
-normalized
B: incremental core 
funding
Competition for 
funding Index**
CH 24 1,5 1 1,3
DE 27 1,7 2 1,9
FR 13 0,8 4 2,4
IT 35 2,3 2 2,1
NL 34 2,2 4 3,1
NO 25 1,6 2 1,8
PT 40 2,6 4 3,3
UK 62 4,0 4 4,0
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role, while budgeting never occur only through bargaining. The for-
mula is by large the main way of allocating resources in eight universities, 
while the other 18 universities combine formula and bargaining.
The level of incrementalism is high (mean 0.63), yet also in this 
case we observe a high variability between universities (ICC 0.23) 
(Table 4.3). Fourteen universities combine incrementalism and prudent 
change, while eight universities display a clear preference for prudent 
change, and only four universities are characterized by strong redistribu-
tion.
Figure 4.1 juxtaposes the importance of formula versus bargaining 
(y-axis) with the level of incrementalism (x-axis), showing no clear-cut 
relationship between formula and incrementalism. A high level of incre-
mentalism (right side of the diagram) can be observed both with a mod-
erate and a strong formula, suggesting that budgeting models do not 
shift simply from high bargaining and incrementalism towards formula 
and strategic approach.
Fig. 4.1 Budgeting process: incrementalism and the use of formula/bargain-
ing. Labels point out the country code
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As to national variations, Swiss and UK universities are character-
ized by relatively lower influence of the formula; Norwegian, Dutch and 
French universities are characterized by medium level of incrementalism; 
Italian and German universities by strong formulas, while Portuguese 
universities are rather homogeneous in terms of strong formula and 
strong incrementalism.
Actors
Figure 4.2 compares the influence of university leadership (y-axis) and 
departments (x-axis) on budgeting. Nowhere is budgeting simply the 
outcome of the government’ will, with state-led quadrant on the bot-
tom left being empty. Neither can budgeting be described in terms of 
a garbage can process, e.g. centred on bargaining between powerful 
departments, with garbage can quadrant also being empty. In fact, the 
central level is influential everywhere, in 10 cases together with depart-
ments (political model- grey area), in 13 cases with an overwhelming 
role (central model), whereas in three universities respondents equally 
divide between the two.
Fig. 4.2 Budgeting actors and influence
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There is little variation between universities regarding the actors’ 
level of influence on budgeting (ICC below 0.10), with the exception 
of the boards (ICC 0.23) and middle managers (ICC 0.18) (Table 4.3). 
Rectors and central administrators are by far the most important internal 
actors influencing budgeting practices, followed by the middle manage-
ment (Fig. 4.3). Ranks of actors are quite consistent: in 22 out of 26 
universities the rector is the most influential actor. Differences between 
universities are larger concerning the board (owing to the different func-
tions of this body in universities), and the middle management. The 
influence of middle management is stronger in UK and Dutch universi-
ties, which can be related to the influence of NPM policies in these two 
countries (Paradeise et al. 2009; Seeber et al. 2015).
A factor analysis on the actors’ share of influence identifies three main 
components.2 The first component is related to the influence of central 
actors, namely the rector and the central administration, and weaker 
influence of the collegial bodies, like the faculty councils. The second 
and third components are related to a stronger influence of deans and 
weaker influence of the board (component 2), and stronger influence of 
individual academics (component 3). Figure 4.4 illustrates the share of 
influence of each category of actor, while universities are ordered from 
left to right according to the importance of central versus decentralized 
actors.3 German and Italian universities are characterized by the strong-
est influence of the central roles. In fact, the influence of academics in 
these two countries mostly pertains to academic issues (Canhilal et al. 
Fig. 4.3 Actors and their influence on budgeting
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2016), while coherently with Rechtsstaat and Napoleonic administrative 
traditions, the central administration is traditionally in charge of budget-
ing. Deans are particularly strong in Dutch, British and three of the five 
Swiss universities.
Allocation Criteria
A clear hierarchy emerges between allocation criteria. The (i) number of 
students and the (ii) number of graduates are by far the most important, 
followed by the (iii) amount of third-party funding attracted, the (iv) 
reputation of the unit and the (v) alignment with the university strate-
gic priorities, whereas (vi) good relationships with the central administra-
tion are considered as clearly less important. Overall, externally driven 
criteria appear more important than internally driven criteria, although 
more variation exists for the first (Table 4.3; Fig. 4.5). The number of 
students and/or the number of graduates are the main allocation crite-
rion in 19 universities, in five universities the most important criterion 
is either third-party funding or reputation, and strategic priorities is the 
most important criterion only in two universities.
Based on a factor analysis, two main components of allocation cri-
teria can be identified.4 The first component includes externally driven 
criteria, i.e. the number of students, the number of graduates and attrac-
tiveness of third-party funding, whereas the second component includes 
internally oriented criteria, i.e. the unit’s scientific reputation, the com-
pliance with the university strategy and the relationships with the central 
administration. Figure 4.6 maps universities according to the scores on 
0%
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Individual 
academics
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councils
Deans
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Rector/president
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Fig. 4.4 Influence of different groups of actors on the budgeting process. 
Central players correspond to solid-colour fills and decentralized players to pat-
terned fills
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external criteria (Y-axis) and internal criteria (X-axis). Patterns by coun-
try can hardly be identified.
The Competition for Funding and the Budgeting Practices
The level of competition for funding is clearly associated with criteria 
related to the attractiveness of external resources (0,54, p-value 0.005), 
whereas there is no relationship with the other budgeting dimensions 
(Table 4.5).
University Budgeting Models
A latent class analysis identifies three clusters (classes) of universities 
according to their budgeting practices in terms of the use of formula, 
the level of incrementalism, the importance of central or decentralized 
actors, and external versus internally driven criteria.5 Table 4.6 resumes 
the main characteristics of the three budgeting clusters.
The budgeting of universities in cluster 1 is characterized by a strong 
influence of the central level, relatively low level of formula, weak incre-
mentalism and prevalence of externally driven criteria. This budget-
ing model characterizes Dutch universities and most Norwegian and 
Fig. 4.6 Importance of allocation criteria and components
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UK universities (see Table 4.6), which are countries where the influ-
ence of NPM has been rather strong (Seeber et al. 2015; Canhilal et al. 
2016). Hence, NPM has been effective in granting the university lead-
ership more decision-making power, allowing substantial reallocation of 
resources.
The budgeting of universities in cluster 2 reflects the characteristics of 
a traditional ‘academic’ budgeting approach, with low impact of the for-
mula, strong incrementalism, a political allocation that balances the influ-
ence of central and decentralized actors as well as prevalence of internally 
driven criteria. This budgeting model is common among universities in 
Switzerland and to some extent Italian universities, which are systems 
where the influence of NPM has been relatively modest.
The budgeting of universities in cluster 3 is characterized by a strong 
formula, a dominance of externally driven criteria, coupled with a high 
level of incrementalism and relatively more influence of central actors. 
This model is seemingly the most bureaucratic of the three, dominated 
by the use of rules through the application of a formula. It is the prevail-
ing model among Portuguese and German universities.
Table 4.5 Funding competition and universities’ budgeting practices
*p-value < 0.05; **p-value < 0.01; ***p-value < 0.001
Resource 
environment
University budgeting
Formula vs 
bargaining
Incrementalism Empowered 
actors
External 
criteria
Competition 
for funding
no link no link no link +0.54***
Table 4.6 Budgeting practices: clusters of universities
Formula Incrementalism Actors Criteria
+(%) ++(%) +(%) ++(%) Political(%) Central(%) Mix(%) External 
(%)
Cluster 1 80 20 100 0 32 68 38 62
Cluster 2 92 8 17 83 68 32 100 0
Cluster 3 0 100 0 100 35 65 19 81
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conclusIons
University budgeting is a major topic of interest among higher educa-
tion scholars, and studies of universities budgeting have inspired some 
of the most renowned models of organizational decision-making. So far, 
empirical explorations have been of limited scale and they have been rare 
in recent decades, whereas in meanwhile reforms inspired by NPM prin-
ciples may have profoundly changed the nature of budgeting. Therefore, 
this chapter investigated the current nature of European universities’ 
budgeting practices, the influence of the resource environment and the 
existence of distinct budgeting models.
A main finding of our analysis is that there are few strong associations 
between the considered budgeting dimensions. This finding contrasts 
with some of the taken-for-granted assumption on the effects of NPM 
reforms, such as that centralization of powers reduces the level of incre-
mentalism. As a matter of fact, NPM does not entail a consistent and 
well-defined set of practices, but rather it provided management princi-
ples that have been adapted and implemented in very different ways.
At the same time, some regularities can indeed be identified. First, 
empirical findings show that all universities are characterized by a con-
siderable influence of the central level, alone or in coexistence with 
departments’ representatives. Budgeting is never the outcome only of 
the government’s will, neither of the mere interaction between depart-
ments. Second, the level of competition for funding is clearly associated 
with higher salience of externally driven criteria than internally driven 
criteria. Moreover, three models of budgeting emerge from our data. 
These models appear to be related, to some extent, to the varying influ-
ence of NPM principles in different national higher education systems. A 
managerial model is the most common among universities from systems 
strongly affected by NPM. This model is characterized by a strong influ-
ence of the rector and central administration, which are able to reallocate 
resources considerably in the short run and mostly according to exter-
nally driven criteria, whereas the formula plays a less important role. The 
universities located in countries weakly affected by NPM mostly display 
an academic model of budgeting, which entails high influence of both 
central and decentralized actors, relevance of both internal and external 
criteria of allocation and a high level of incrementalism. In Portugal and 
Germany, i.e. medium NPM countries, the budgeting model is centred 
on the use of formula, allocation is driven by externally oriented criteria, 
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and incrementalism is strong. We believe that future research can be ori-
ented to explore more in depth the characteristics of the three budgeting 
models, their pros and cons, and their diffusion across systems and types 
of higher education institutions.
notes
1.  In this table the scales replicate those employed in the questionnaire: 
a value of 1 points out a high importance and a value of 5 indicates no 
importance at all. Instead, in the next paragraphs, the scales of tables and 
graphs have been changed to improve readability, using ‘1’ as a value for 
high influence and ‘0’ for no influence.
2.  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
The two components account for 83% of the variance.
3.  Influence on internal budgeting can be conceived as a zero-sum game. 
Thus, the share of influence was considered instead of the absolute values.
4.  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: 
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
The two components accounts for 73% of the variance.
5.  Goodness of fit indicators for the solution at 3 classes outperforms the 
solution with 2 classes. Given the small number of universities considered, 
solution above 4 classes are not acceptable as the degrees of freedom go 
below zero. The level of incrementalism has been dichotomized between 
strong and non-strong. Attribution of universities to clusters is very clear 
in 22 cases (probability of belonging to a given cluster x between 87 and 
100%), while for three universities two clusters were relevant (probability 
between 43 and 57%, and 48 and 52%). One UK university could not be 
included in the LCA because missing the information on formula; it was 
ex-post attributed to clusters 2 and 3 as sharing two of the three character-
izing elements respectively.
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